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Foreword
The paper analyses networks with interdependent risks or network risks, which are the
key issue defining the robustness of infrastructures. Standard risk management methods
mainly consider the case of a relatively simple system facing only external (exogenous)
sources of risk and uncertainty.
The paper focuses on approaches for dealing with, in general endogenous network
risks. In particular, it proposes a stochastic, dynamic model of attitude formation that
takes account of individual interactions under uncertainty and networks governing intrin-
sic dynamic of attitudes and adoption patterns.
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Abstract
Study of network risks allows to develop insights into the methods of building robust
networks, which are also critical elements of infrastructures that are of a paramount im-
portance for the modern society. In this paper we show how the modern quantitative
modeling methodologies can be employed for analysis of network risks and for design
of robust networks under uncertainty. This is done on the example of important problem
arising in the process of building of the information infrastructure: provision of advanced
mobile data services.
We show how portfolio theory developed in the modern finance can be used for design
of robust provision network comprising of independent agents. After this the modeling
frameworks of Bayesian nets and Markov fields are used for the study of several problems
fundamental for the process of service adoption such as the sensitivity of networks, the
direction of improvements, and the propagation of user attitudes on social networks.
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Modeling and robust design of networks under risk: the
case of information infrastructure
Yuri Ermoliev(ermoliev@iiasa.ac.at)*
Alexei Gaivoronski (Alexei.Gaivoronski@iot.ntnu.no) ** ***
Marek Makowski (marek@iiasa.ac.at) *
1 Introduction
This paper is dedicated to a study of the network risks which are the key issues defining
the robustness of infrastructures. There are similarities between network risks and catas-
trophic risks: both have interdependencies in space and time. An appropriate analysis
of these two classes of risks requires adaptation, integration, extension and further de-
velopment of methodologies for quantitative modeling of uncertainty and risks that have
emerged during recent decades in such fields as economics and finance, optimization,
simulation of stochastic and multiagent systems. For more detailed treatment we have se-
lected two such methodologies: portfolio theory of finance and Bayesian networks, both
coupled with optimization approach. The purpose of this paper is to show how these
methodological tools can be extended and applied for the study of network risks with the
emphasis on information infrastructure.
Besides clarifying the methodological issues, we aim also at creation of integrated
modeling decision support environment for analysis of network risks. This environment
will enable identification and evaluation of critical bottlenecks inherent in important in-
frastructures seen as specialized networks and allow to give advice to planning and regu-
lating bodies on robust design and improvement of these infrastructures.
More specifically, we look at the risk adapted performance networks composed of
nodes and links of different levels of complexity. The risk adjusted performance of each
node can be improved by selecting appropriate control parameters. In addition, perfor-
mance of each node is affected by uncertainties. These network elements or nodes are
designed (or behave) from the point of view of local tradeoff between local performance
and risk. This risk can be exogenous to the network as well as endogenous, generated
by inappropriate functioning of other network elements. What is important, the overall
performance of the network is also affected by risk on the global level. This risk is under-
stood as eventuality that the global performance can differ, sometimes drastically, from
the expected network performance. The key issue in the designing of robust network is to
*Integrated Modeling Environment Project of IIASA.
**Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway.
***Corresponding author.
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assure that a local level of risk/performance tradeoff results in desirable risk/performance
tradeoff on the global level. This is one of the central issues which we aim to clarify.
Here we briefly discuss three examples of infrastructure which can be described as
risk/performance networks.
1. Energy infrastructure. Electric power infrastructure can be described as the net-
work with several levels of hierarchy where the nodes correspond to production, distribu-
tion and consumption facilities while the arcs represent transmission lines. On the local
level each node has production and consumption targets subject to uncertainty and risk
manifested as equipment failures, local demand variations, local weather patterns impor-
tant for hydro and wind generation. On the global level this infrastructure should meet
electric power demand of consumers and industries subject to uncertainties and risk of
disruptions, prices for fuel and energy, weather, societal attitudes towards certain genera-
tion technologies, climate change.
Earlier was the case when this performance/risk tradeoff was much easier to achieve.
This was when the public utilities managed generation and transport in almost each coun-
try. Since then the electric power industry is deregulated or being deregulated in almost all
developed countries. The industry is now composed of many independent actors which
decide their production plans according to market conditions. Besides, the totally new
actors have entered the field, like energy contracts traders and speculators, and energy
exchanges. Yet they have to act in concert if this infrastructure is to fulfill in a robust
manner the energy needs of society at large. This is a critical issue as the power shortages
in California and price surges in Norway have shown.
What are robust risk management methods which will mitigate these new risks which
result from market forces and individual actors’ behavior? What is the robust way to
assure that the local decisions on risk/performance tradeoff which every actor takes will
transform into optimal or even acceptable tradeoff on the global level? What lessons
developing countries can learn from the experience of developed countries in this respect?
These are the questions which our paper aims to answer.
2. Gas transport and distribution infrastructure. Similar issues of networked risk/per-
formance management arise in other types of infrastructure. For example, developing
the gas transport and consumption infrastructure in Europe largely follows deregulation
patterns of electric power infrastructure according to EU directives, and the same is true
about railroad transport.
3. Information and communication network infrastructure. It can be described as
superposition of several layers of hierarchical networks each one consisting of nodes con-
nected with links. There are also mappings connecting different layers. The network
nodes are represented by heterogeneous devices like routers, switches, crossconnects, etc.
Each of these devices is equipped by control structures which govern communication
flows through the network like communication protocols, routing tables, call admission
rules, etc. These control parameters are tuned largely independently in order to meet per-
formance targets of each node. Uncertainty on the node level comes from highly variable
communication flows, but also from actions of adjacent nodes. There are also risks of
equipment failures, congestion, malicious attacks, link failures which threaten the perfor-
mance targets.
Each of the nodes is build to achieve admissible tradeoff between performance, costs
and risk on the local level. The entire network, however, should satisfy various global
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performance targets, like a satisfaction of communication and information demand with
quality of service guarantees for the user population. Besides, the operation of this in-
frastructure should be economically attractive for industrial actors which own its different
parts. Global sources of risks and uncertainty include both external component (chang-
ing usage patterns and global malicious disturbances) and internal component (connected
with conflicting interests of different actors).
How this local tradeoff between performance and risk at the node level affects the
global tradeoff on the infrastructure level and vice versa? What are the economically
sound principles for further robust development and operation of this infrastructure under
inherent risk and uncertainty? Where are the bottlenecks which threaten its global perfor-
mance? These are the questions which require the new methodology of the network risk
analysis and robust risk management to which this paper aims to contribute.
Methods for taking the optimal decisions under uncertainty and related issues of risk
management have been at the center of methodological development in the last couple of
decades and more recently they have met also a considerable and rising industrial inter-
est. One can mention stochastic programming which is a hot topic in operations research
community now and it has become an important modeling tool in quantitative finance, en-
ergy, telecommunications and other industrial fields. Understanding of importance of risk
management in finance resulted in the development of several risk management paradigms
and industrial standards which are now being gradually adopted also in other industrial
branches. However, these and other methods mainly consider the case of a relatively sim-
ple system under control which is facing external sources of risk and uncertainty. The
real challenge is to look at the network of such systems and study the effects of risk and
uncertainty on its overall performance.
In this paper we look how these general considerations about network risks are trans-
lated for the case of information infrastructure. This infrastructure consists of several
components which are currently in the different stages of development. In this paper we
consider development and deployment of one such component which importance increas-
ing: advanced mobile data services. We show how related risks can be analyzed using
and further extending for this case quantitative risk modeling methodologies. In partic-
ular, portfolio theory developed in finance is extended for analysis and design of service
provision networks (Sections 2-6). After this Bayesian nets and Markov fields models are
used in order to predict and analyze the sensitivity of networks, the directions of improve-
ments, and the service adoption patterns, all of which depend on complex interplay of
attitudes of different groups of population. The main message is that advanced method-
ological toolbox is necessary for analysis of network risks, here we consider and develop
two components of such toolbox.
2 Cooperative provision of advanced mobile data services
Design of advanced mobile data services to be carried on 3G networks and the networks
of further generations is the hot topic in telecommunication industry and academy. This
is because the business success of provision of such services will define the business suc-
cess of the mobile operators and other relevant industrial actors in the near to medium
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future. In this respect considerable attention is given to design and development of ser-
vice provision platforms which support a set of tools and basic services that facilitate
development, deployment and customization of specialized services by service providers
and even non-professional end users.
Deployment and operation of service provision platforms and provision of individual
services requires collaboration of different industrial actors who contribute to the common
goal with their individual capabilities and expertise. One can think about fixed network
operators, mobile operators, providers of different information content, internet providers,
software developers and other actors who will join forces to provide a successful service.
Provision of a service involves assuming different roles and industrial actors can combine
such roles. All this gives a rich picture of service provision environment where a multitude
of actors cooperate and compete in order to deliver to customers a wide range of services
in a profitable manner.
Understandably, the main research and development effort so far has been concen-
trated on technological and engineering aspects which enable the provisioning of ad-
vanced mobile data services. The history of information technology testifies, however,
that the possession of the best technological solution is not necessarily enough to assure
the business success of an enterprise. Very important and sometimes neglected aspect
is design and evaluation of appropriate business model which would support the service
provision. Business models for provision of a service requiring a single actor are pretty
well understood, both organizationally and economically. This is the case, for example, of
provisioning of the traditional voice service over fixed network. When an actor evaluates
the economic feasibility of entering the provision of such service, he can employ quanti-
tative tools developed by investment science, like estimation of the Net Present Value of
such project [19]. Usually an actor should choose between several service provisioning
projects, each providing return on investment and generating the risky cash flows. Then
the portfolio theory [21] suggests the way to balance between return and risk and select
the best portfolio of projects taking into account the actor’s risk attitudes. The adequate
risk management is especially important in a highly volatile telecommunication environ-
ment and the industrial standards in this respect are starting to emerge, originating from
the financial industry [1]. Industrial projects in high-tech industries are often character-
ized by considerable uncertainty and at the same time carry different flexibilities. The
real options approach [25] allows to take these flexibilities into account while making
evaluation of the profitability of the project. Stochastic programming [10], [3], [13], [18]
provide the optimization models for adequate treatment of uncertainty in the planning of
service provision.
Business models for cooperative service provision involving different constellations
of actors are studied to much lesser extent. The understanding of their importance has
lead to some qualitative analysis in [11], [17], but the quantitative analysis similar to what
exists for the single actor case remains a challenge. The methods mentioned above are all
developed to be used by a single actor engaged in the selection and risk management of
his portfolio of industrial projects. The influence of other actors is present only implicitly
on the stage of estimation of the future cash flows. This is not enough for adequate
analysis of collaborative service provision. Suppose, for example, that a service provider
delivers a service to a population of users and receives a revenue for this delivery. If a
service is composed from modules and enablers provided by different actors then this
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service provider has to decide about the revenue division between the actors which will
make it attractive to them to participate in the service provision. This revenue sharing
decision together with a concept of what is attractive to other actors he should explicitly
incorporate in the evaluation of profitability of this project.
Here we contribute to the adaptation and further development of the methods of eval-
uation and risk management of business models and industrial projects for the case of the
collaborative service provision. We look at the actors engaging in a service provision as
making a decision about the composition of their portfolio of services to which they are
going to contribute. They do this independently following the risk management frame-
work of portfolio theory. The pricing and revenue sharing schemes induce the actors to
contribute the right amount of provision capacity to participation in the service provi-
sion. We develop a two tier modeling framework which results in selection of pricing and
revenue sharing in the optimal way. This is done by utilizing the approach of stochastic
optimization with bilevel structure [2], combining it with portfolio theory.
3 Simplified model of the service portfolio
In this Section we are going to develop a quantitative description of the service provision-
ing model involving several actors having as the background the environment presented
in the previous Section.
3.1 Description of services
The composition of a service can be quite complex, especially if we take into account
that various components of that picture can be services themselves and subject to further
disaggregation. For the purposes of clarity we are going to start from a simpler description
which still possess the main features of the provision environment important for business
modeling. Namely, two levels of the service composition will be considered here as shown
in example in Figure 1.
In this case the service environment is composed from two types of services. The
first type is comprised from services with structure and provision we are interested in and
which we are going to consider in some detail. They can be provided in the context of a
service platform and therefore they will be referred to as platform services. There will be
also 3rd party services whose structure is of no concern to our modeling purposes. They
are present in the model for the purposes of the adequate modeling of the environment in
which the provisioning of the platform services happens. Let us now consider the model
of provisioning of platform services.
The main building blocks of the platform services are service enablers indexed by
i = 1 : N and services indexed by j = 1 :M. Enablers are measured in units relevant for
their description, like bandwidth, content volume, etc. The relation between enablers and
services is described by coefficients λij which measure the amount of enabler i necessary
for provision of the unit amount of service j. Thus, a service j can be described by vector
λj = (λ1j , . . . , λNj) (1)
This description is obtained from analysis of the usage scenarios described in the Sec-
tion 2. A service j generates a revenue vj per unit of service. This quantity depends on
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the service pricing which in its turn depends on the user behavior and market structure.
For the moment let us assume that vj is the random variable with known distribution, later
in the Section 4.3 we shall describe this revenue in more detail. This distribution can be
recovered from the expert estimates and from simulation models which would explore
the structure of user preferences and market features. The random variables vj can be
correlated due to the service substitution, macroeconomic phenomena and other causes.
Services can be provided by different constellations of actors. In this paper we con-
sider one such constellation where the actors are the enterprises which have the capability
to provide service enablers assuming different roles, they are indexed by k = 1 : K. Ac-
tors may choose to join forces to provide a service. Contribution of a given actor consists
of taking responsibility for provision of one or more enablers of the service. Sometimes
these actors will be referred to as enabler providers. There will be an actor who provides
the service aggregation functionality and organizes the overall service delivery to the end
users, this actor will be referred to as a service provider. This actor can provide the whole
bundle of platform services and he will decide which services to include in this bundle.
Often he will collect the revenue from the end users and distribute it among the enabler
providers.
Figure 1: Service provision for business person on the move.
Example 1 Service provision for business person on the move. (see Figure 1).
This is a simplified yet realistic example of service provision which was developed
on the basis of the project results of the EU project SPICE and NFR project ISIS. The
addressed terminal here is a smart mobile phone used by a business person on the move.
We consider here the services which run on the service platform and third party ser-
vices which partially compete with them, being accessible from the same terminal. We
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have simplified this example to just total of six native services, two third party services
and five enablers (from hundreds of services and dozens of enablers, distributed in several
service platforms) available in this service platform. However, services in this platform
correspond well to the business offer of a typical service provider. Service bundles have
been defined in accordance to the market segments, corresponding customer classes, user
behavior, requirements and various subscription schemes. More specifically, we consider
the following services.
Native services of the platform:
1. N1 - Messaging;
2. N2 - Audio conferencing;
3. N3 - Video conferencing;
4. N4 - Location based services.
5. N5 - News.
6. N6 - Point of Interest service.
Third party services.
1. 3P1 - Third party Information service
2. 3P2 - Third party News service
The following business actors collaborate in providing the mobile service bundle to
the users
1. E1 - Network provider – providing the network access.
2. E2 - Context provider – service context retrieval and management.
3. E3 - Service provider – responsible for service provision.
4. E4 - Content provider – content retrieval and management.
5. E5 - Provider of A4C (authentication, authorization, auditing, accounting and
charging) enabler. This actor will often coincide with the service provider, but one can
envisage also the cases when it will be a distinct actor.
Besides, there are one or more providers of the third party services which are in partial
competition with the platform services.
This example will be treated in some detail in Section 6.
The objective of an enabler provider is to select a portfolio of services to which this
actor will make a contribution. This decision is made on the grounds of balance between
projected profit from enabler provision balanced against the risk of variations in demand
and service acceptance among the prospective users of services. In order to quantify this
decision process it is necessary to use a simplified profit model for an actor.
It is assumed that the revenue vj generated by a unit of service j is distributed among
the actors who participate in the creation of service. There can be different schemes for
such subdivision. It is assumed here that this distribution is performed using a vector of
revenue shares
γj = (γ1j, .., γNj) , γ = (γ11, .., γN1, ..., γ1M, .., γNM)
such that an actor which contributes with the enabler i receives the revenue γijvj. Deter-
mination of these revenue sharing coefficients is one of the objectives of the design of the
business model for service provision.
Besides platform services the actors can supply enablers also to the 3rd party services.
The structure of these services is not specified and it is assumed that they are fully de-
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scribed by the revenue vij generated by provision of the unit of enabler i to 3rd party
service j, j = M + 1, ..., M¯.
3.2 Profit model of an actor
Let us consider the situation when all the actors have already developed the capacities
for provision of enablers. Thus, for the time being the investment process necessary
for creation and expansion of these capacities is not the part of our model, however,
it will be considered at the later stages. For this reason at this stage it is enough to
consider only variable costs due to the operation of capacities and provision of enablers.
Alternatively, one can assume that the cost structure includes both the operational and
discounted portion of the investment costs for enabler development, recalculated down to
the enabler and the service instances.
For further formulation of the actor’s profit model let us introduce the following nota-
tions.
cik - unit provision costs for enabler i by actor k;
Wik - provision capability of enabler i of actor k;
xijk - the portion of provision capability for enabler i of actor k dedicated to partici-
pation in provision of service j.
Now the revenue of actor k obtained from contribution to provision of the platform
service j can be expressed as follows. The quantity xijkWik will be the volume of provi-
sion of enabler i dedicated by actor k to service j. Assuming that the required quantity of
other enablers is available, this will result in the volume of service j in which the actor k
participates to be xijkWik/λij . The total revenue from this service will be vjxijkWki/λij
and the part of the revenue which goes to actor k will be vjxijkWikγij/λij .
For the 3rd party service the revenue will be vijxijkWik.
The total costs incurred by actor k for the provision of enabler i to service j will be
xijkcikWik.
In order to simplify the following discussion let us assume now that the actor k par-
ticipates in the provision of service j by contributing only one enabler i = i(k, j) or
assuming only one role. Taking the profit pik to be the difference between the revenue and
costs, the profit of the actor k can be expressed as follows:
pik =
M∑
j=1
(
vjxijkWik
γij
λij
− xijkcikWik
)
+
M¯∑
j=M+1
(vijxijkWik − xijkcikWik)
=
M∑
j=1
xijkWikcik
(
vjγij
cikλij
− 1
)
+
M¯∑
j=M+1
xijkWikcik
(
vij
cik
− 1
)
In the expression above index i depends on the values of indices j and k. Now let us
assume that the actor k assumes only one role which consists in the provision of enabler i
to different services which require this enabler. Thus, we consider a generic actor whose
role is to provide enabler i to different services. Then we can simplify notations by taking
xijk = xij, Wik = Wi, cik = ci, pik = pii. In this case the profit will be
pii = Wici
(
M∑
j=1
xij
(
vjγij
ciλij
− 1
)
+
M¯∑
j=M+1
xij
(
vij
ci
− 1
))
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Dividing the profit by the total costs Wici we obtain the return ri on investment by a
generic actor which assumes the role of provision of enabler i to services which require
this enabler.
ri =
M∑
j=1
xij
(
vjγij
ciλij
− 1
)
+
M¯∑
j=M+1
xij
(
vij
ci
− 1
)
(2)
3.3 Service portfolio: financial perspective
The profit representation (2) allows us to look at the enabler provision from the point of
view of financial portfolio theory [21]. The actor with the role to provide the enabler i has
to choose the set of services to which provide this enabler from all the possible available
services requiring this enabler. In other words, he has to select his service portfolio. This
portfolio is defined by shares xij of his provision capability,
xi = (xi1, ..., xiM¯)
Return coefficients associated with his participation in each platform service are expressed
as
rij =
vjγij
ciλij
− 1, j = 1 :M (3)
and for the 3rd party services these coefficients are
rij =
vij
ci
− 1, j = M + 1 : M¯ . (4)
These coefficients depend on the random variables which are mostly the revenue per unit
of service vj and the revenue per component provision vij. Randomness here is due to the
uncertainty in demand and the user acceptance of service. However, both enabler provi-
sion costs ci and even enabler shares λij also will be random variables due to uncertainty
inherent in the service usage patterns and the evolution of costs. Besides, the costs ci often
will be the estimates of the provision costs of enabler provider i made by some other ac-
tor. Such estimates are inherently imprecise and are better described by random variables
similarly to how it was done in [2]. The expected return coefficients are
µij = γijE
vj
ciλij
− 1, j = 1 :M, µij = E
vij
ci
− 1, j = M + 1 : M¯ (5)
and expected return r¯i(xi) of service portfolio is
r¯i(xi) =
M¯∑
j=1
µijxij =
M∑
j=1
xij
(
γijE
vj
ciλij
− 1
)
+
M¯∑
j=M+1
xij
(
E
vij
ci
− 1
)
(6)
However, the realized return can differ substantially from the expected return due to un-
certainty discussed above. This introduces the risk R(xi) for an actor which assumes the
enabler provision role. Financial theory traditionally measures this risk as the variance
of portfolio return [21]. Recently several different risk measures were introduced and, in
particular Value at Risk (VaR) and its many modifications. The VaR has attained the level
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of industrial standard in the financial risk management [1]. In this section the variance and
the standard deviation of the return will be used as the risk measure because the correct
selection of the risk measure in the context of collaborative service provision is outside
the scope of this paper and it will be addressed by us in the subsequent papers. What is
important here is that the consideration of the risk measures allow an actor to estimate the
probability and size of his future losses. Thus, we take
R(xi) = StDev(ri(xi)) = StDev
(
M¯∑
j=1
rijxij
)
(7)
where return coefficients rij are taken from (3),(4).
Portfolio theory looks at the portfolio selection as the trade-off between risk and re-
turn. Its application to our problem of service portfolio consists of the following steps.
1. Construction of efficient frontier. Some average return target η is fixed. The risk of
service portfolio is minimized with constraint on this return target. The risk minimization
problem looks as follows.
min
x
StDev2
(
M¯∑
j=1
rijxij
)
(8)
M¯∑
j=1
µijxij = η (9)
M¯∑
j=1
xij = 1, xij ≥ 0 (10)
Solution of this problem for all admissible values of target return η will provide the set
of service portfolios which are the reasonable candidates for selection by actor who pro-
vides the enabler j. They constitute the efficient frontier of the set of all possible service
portfolios. This concept is illustrated in Figure 2.
Each service portfolio x can be characterized by pair (risk,return) defined by (7) and
(6) respectively. Therefore it can be represented as a point in the risk-return space depicted
in Figure 2. The set of such points for all possible portfolios describes all existing relations
between risk and return and is called the feasible set. Which of possible service portfolios
an actor should choose? It depends on the objectives which an actor pursues. Here we
assume that an actor’s decision depends on return and risk only. Namely, an actor will seek
the highest possible return among equally risky alternatives and he will seek the lowest
possible risk among equally profitable alternatives. This is a simplification because in
reality the actors can be driven by other considerations, like increase of market share,
revenue, regulatory constraints, etc. However, the consideration of only risk and return
provides with the reasonable starting point for analysis of business models. More complex
cases can be taken into account in a similar manner by introducing additional constraints
on the feasible set or by modifying the concept of performance. For example, suppose
that an actor has three objectives: return and market share to maximize and the risk to
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minimize. Then the market share and the return can be integrated in one performance
measure by assigning weights to these objectives. The weights will measure the relative
importance of return and market share to the actor. The composite performance measure
is obtained by computing the weighted sum of the original objectives. The risk is defined
as the variation of this composite measure. This composite performance measure is used
in Figure 2 instead of return.
risk
return
?
feasible set
R
x
efficient frontier
x0x1
x2
Figure 2: Selection of service portfolio
Considering the Figure 2 it becomes clear that some of the service portfolios should
be preferred to others. For example, let us consider portfolio x0 to which corresponds the
point in risk-return space inside the feasible set, as in Figure 2. It is clear that portfolio
x2 should be preferred to x0 by an agent who makes his decision on the basis of return
and risk. This is because portfolio x2 has the same risk as portfolio x0 and larger return.
Similarly, portfolio x1 also should be preferred to x0 because it provides the same return
with the smaller risk. Thus, portfolio x0 is dominated by both portfolios x1 and x2 and
should not be taken in consideration. The actor whose decisions are guided by risk and
return should consider only nondominated portfolios which constitute efficient frontier,
depicted by dotted curve in Figure 2. This efficient frontier can be computed by solving
the problem (8)-(10) for different values of η. This efficient frontier can be viewed also as
the solution of the two objective optimization problem of minimizing risk and maximizing
return under the constraints (10).
The above outlined approach to the multicriteria analysis is suitable for problems
having a small number of independent criteria that have compensatory character, i.e.,
for which it is possible to define a composite performance measure using weights, and
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to compute the efficient frontier by a parametric optimization approach. However, the
weight-bases approaches have several limitations discussed e.g., in [20]. Therefore one
should consider a truly multicriteria analysis approach, see e.g., [26], and a modular tool
(such as ISAAP described in [16]) that supports interactive analysis of trade-offs between
conflicting objectives.
2. Selection of the target service portfolio. The previous step resulted in the selection
of much smaller set of efficient service portfolios from the set of all possible service
portfolios. These portfolios form the efficient frontier in the risk-return space. An actor
selects his target service portfolio from this efficient set by choosing the trade-off between
risk and return. One way to achieve this trade-off is to consider the largest risk an actor
is willing to take. Suppose that the value of such risk is R (see Figure 2). Then the actor
should choose the portfolio x on efficient frontier with this value of risk. Suppose that this
service portfolio yields return η. No other portfolio yields better return without increasing
the risk. If an actor is not satisfied with return η this means that he should increase his risk
tolerance or look for opportunities to participate in the service provision not yet described
in this model. Or, such actor should seek more advantageous revenue sharing scheme.
From these considerations it is clear that all important opportunities of participation
in service provision should be included in this model. For example, suppose that an
actor assumes the role of content provision and can contribute his content to advanced
mobile data service and at the same time this content can be contributed to, say, traditional
newspaper. Both opportunities should be included in the model with the traditional service
being modeled as a 3rd party service.
4 Modeling of collaborative service provision
In the previous Section we highlighted the importance of having the adequate forecasts
of the cash flows generated by services in order to quantitatively evaluate the economic
future of the service and business models which support the service provision. Due to
uncertainty inherent in the user response and technological development any such fore-
cast should be given in terms of random variables which assign probabilities to different
scenarios of user response and possible evolution of other uncertain parameters. The fore-
casts should take into account the mutual influence of services which result in correlation
between cash flows generated by different services.
Such description allows to look at the providers of different service enablers as actors
which independently select the service portfolios having their targets described in terms
of return on investment and risk tolerance. However, a service can become a reality only
if the participation in its provision will be consistent with these individual targets. This
means that all actors which cover the roles indispensable for provision of a particular
service should have this service in their efficient service portfolio. In other words, the ser-
vice portfolios of the relevant actors should be compatible. There are several items which
affect the risk/return characteristics of a service portfolio and decide whether a particu-
lar service will be present in it. One is the cash flow generated by a service j, another
is the revenue sharing scheme γj . Besides, the enabler provision capacities, industrial
risk/return standards, market prices, all play a role in making service portfolios compati-
ble. In this Section we are going to characterize the properties which facilitate the service
portfolio compatibility and develop a model for selection of the revenue sharing scheme.
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4.1 Service provision capacities
According to (1) a platform service j is described by vector λj of the service enablers. Let
us denote by Ij the set of enablers which are present in the service description in nonzero
quantities:
Ij = {i : λij > 0}
For each enabler i ∈ Ij an actor should be found who is willing to take a role of provision
of this enabler. This means that the position j in service portfolio of generic actor who
provides enabler i ∈ Ij should be nonnegative: xij > 0. The value of this position
allows to estimate the enabler provision capacity which an actor should possess. Indeed,
xij is a fraction of provision capacity which an actor is going to dedicate to provision
of enabler i to service j. Therefore λij/xij is the capacity necessary to provide a unit
of service j. Suppose that Bminj is the minimal volume of provision of service j which
makes such provision viable, and Bj is the target volume of service provision for a generic
constellation of actors which is going to provide this service. Then we have the following
constraints on the service provision capacities of actors:
Wixij ≥ λijB
min
j , i ∈ Ij (11)
if the provision of service j will be viable at all and
Wixij ≥ λijBj , i ∈ Ij (12)
if only one actor with provision capability of enabler i is desirable in the constellation
which provides service j. These constraints can help to make decisions about the nature of
the actors which should be encouraged to participate in the provision of different services.
For example, some enablers of some services will be provided by established actors with
large provision capacity. In such cases the share xij of capacity dedicated to service j can
be small. In other cases the service enablers will be provided by startups with relatively
small capacity. In such cases the share xij should be large or even equal to 1. These shares
implicitly depend on the revenue sharing scheme γj through the solution of problem (8)-
(10) and in the latter case it may be beneficial on the initial stages of service penetration
to encourage startups by appropriate adjustment of the revenue sharing scheme.
The constraints (11)-(12) can be also looked at as the constraints on the composition
of service portfolio. Suppose that Wmaxi is the maximal desirable component provision
capacity which an actor providing enabler i should possess. Then the smallest share xij
dedicated to service j should be
xij ≥ λij
Bminj
Wmaxi
, i ∈ Ij (13)
4.2 Risk/return industrial expectations
Provision of advanced mobile data services will involve different actors coming from dif-
ferent backgrounds and industries. There will be many startups, but there will be also
established actors from other industrial branches. One example is the content provision
where the same content can be provided to newspapers, internet and mobile terminals.
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Such actors will have the attitudes towards admissible and/or desirable returns on invest-
ment and rewards which taking risk should bring. Often such attitudes will be influenced
by industrial standards and expectations inherited from their previous activity. One way
to express these expectations is to include all generic projects, in which an actor can be
involved in his traditional business, as services in the set of all considered 3rd party ser-
vices in this model. This is especially useful approach if the revenues from the traditional
activities will influence and will be influenced by the revenues from the mobile services
under consideration. Another possibility is to account for these expectations explicitly.
This can be done by introducing the connection between the expected return r¯i(xi) and
risk R(xi) from (6),(7) as follows:
r¯i(xi) ≥ ai + biR(xi) (14)
where ai will be the return on investment associated with traditional activity while biR(xi)
will be the risk premium associated with the participation in provision of advanced mobile
data services. The coefficients ai and bi will depend also on individual characteristics of
an actor like size, market position.
Beside this an actor will have the risk tolerance expressed in terms of the upper bound
on risk which he is willing to take irrespective of return:
R(xi) ≤ R¯ (15)
The upper bound on admissible risk R¯ will again depend on the characteristics of a par-
ticular actor. To put it simply, this is the maximal loss an actor can afford during the time
period under consideration.
4.3 Pricing
The revenue per unit of service vj together with the service composition λj and the rev-
enue sharing scheme γj defines the unit price pi of enabler i :
pi =
vjγij
λij
This is a random variable since the revenue is also random. Therefore the expected price
p¯i = Epi will be
p¯i =
γij
λij
Evj
An actor providing the enabler i may have the target p∗i for the price of his product and
the tolerances ∆+ and ∆− within which he is willing to accept a different price. These
targets can result from the market prices in established industries, internal market studies,
internal cost estimates. This will lead to the following constraints
p∗i −∆
− ≤
γij
λij
Evj ≤ p
∗
i +∆
+ (16)
This constraint should be taken into account while considering the revenue sharing schemes.
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4.4 Revenue sharing schemes
Now let us look at the problem of selecting the revenue sharing coefficients γj which
would be compatible with the concerted provision of a platform service. Summarizing
the discussion present in Sections 3, 4.1 and 4.2 we obtain that the actor which supplies
enabler i will select portfolio of services xi = (xi1, ..., xiM¯) by solving the following
problem
max
xi
r¯i(xi, γj) (17)
subject to constraints
M¯∑
j=1
xij = 1, xij ≥ 0 (18)
r¯i(xi, γj) ≥ ai + biR(xi, γj) (19)
R(xi, γj) ≤ R¯ (20)
where r¯i(xi, γj) is the expected return of the actor on his expenditure and R(xi, γj) is
the risk defined in (6) and (7) respectively. We emphasize here the dependence of risk
and return on the revenue sharing scheme γj. Solution of this problem will give service
portfolios xi(γj) for all generic actors providing enabler i for the platform services j = 1 :
M . These service portfolios will depend on the revenue sharing schemes γj . Let us now
concentrate on a particular service with index j. In order that a provision of this service
becomes possible it is necessary that all actors which provide the necessary enablers to
this service will include it in their service portfolios in desirable proportions. This means
that
xi(γj) ∈ Xj for all i ∈ Ij (21)
where the set Xj can be defined, for example, by constraints (13). Constraints (21) define
the feasible set of the revenue sharing coefficients and if these constraints are not satisfied
then the service will not come into being.
Suppose now that the enabler number 1 of service j is a service aggregation enabler
which is provided by an actor which bears overall responsibility for the functioning of
service and receives the revenue stream from the end users. His responsibility includes
also the division of the revenue stream between the participating actors and the selection
for this purpose of the revenue sharing coefficients γj. He should select these coefficients
in such a way that the constraints (21) are satisfied. Between all such revenue sharing co-
efficients he would select ones which would maximize his return. This can be formulated
as the following optimization problem.
max
γj
r¯1(x1(γj), γj) (22)
subject to constraints
xi(γj) ∈ Xj for all i ∈ Ij (23)
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γj ∈ Γj (24)
where the set Γj can be defined, for example, by constraints (16). Even simpler, this actor
may wish to maximize his revenue share
max
γj
γ1j (25)
under constraints (23)-(24). Observe that the feasible set of this optimization problem
depends on the solution of the other actor’s optimization problems (17)-(20) similar to
how it depends in optimization problems with bilevel structure.
5 The properties of models and implementation issues
In Section 4.4 we have presented two models for strategic assessment of collaborative
provision of mobile data services. These models possess quite complicated structure, al-
though we have made a few simplifying assumptions during their development. They
can be looked at as a special type of stochastic optimization problems with bilevel struc-
ture [2], where the lower level is composed from the problems of individual component
providers (17)-(20) while the upper level contains the problem of service provider (22)-
(24) . Stochasticity comes from uncertainty inherent in the information about the charac-
teristics of advanced data services and the user response to them. So far we have adopted
a relatively simple treatment of uncertainty substituting the random variables by their ex-
pected values in some cases, while in the other cases the special structure of the problem
allowed to limit the modeling to the expected values and covariance matrix. This can be
viewed as a special type of the deterministic equivalent of stochastic programming prob-
lems, a technique widely used in stochastic programming (see [3] for more discussion on
different types of deterministic equivalents). More detailed description of this uncertainty
can be introduced in these models similar to how it was done in [2]. Different bilevel
optimization problems have drawn considerable attention recently, see [5], [6], [22], [24].
Such problems provide quite a challenge to current numerical optimization proce-
dures. While many theoretical issues are understood reasonably well, the solution tech-
niques have not yet reached the off-shelf commercial codes like CPLEX available for
linear and some nonlinear programming problems. The main challenge here is that the
upper level problems can be highly nonlinear and nonconvex with multiple local minima.
Therefore substantial implementation work is needed which would exploit the structure
of the problems. Still, our aim here is to create a set of decision support tools for eval-
uation of business models, where the computational complexities should be hidden from
the end user. We have found that this aim can be achieved by combination of customized
implementation with the use of general purpose mathematical modeling systems and com-
mercial software. The general architecture of the system under development is shown in
Figure 3.
The system is composed of four components: data and user interface, a set of service
models, a set of mathematical models and a library of solvers.
Data and user interface is implemented in Excel due to its familiarity to potential
users. Its purpose is to provide an easy tool for storing and changing the data describ-
ing the service and customer properties, for presentation of results of business modeling
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Figure 3: Architecture of decision support system for evaluation of business models of
service provision
and for providing the capability to the system user to ask what-if questions pertaining to
different scenarios. For example, the efficient frontier from Figure 2 is presented to user
through this component.
Service model provides the capability to perform detailed modeling of advanced data
services. It is implemented in specialized modeling language which has the necessary
features for describing communication sequences. This model provides the aggregated
description of services composition λj from (1).
Mathematical model implements the quantitative description of the business decision
process of collaborative service provision from previous Sections. It imports data from
data interface and implements the top level structures and algorithms necessary for rep-
resentation and solution of models (17)-(20),(22)-(24). The custom algorithms for anal-
ysis and solution of these models are also implemented in MATLAB. This component
is also responsible for calling external software for solving subproblems where standard
approaches and commercial software are available. For example (8)-(10) is a quadratic
programming problem which can be solved by many solvers, among them by CPLEX and
MATLAB optimization toolbox.
Library of solvers contains solvers for linear and nonlinear programming problems
and some specialized solvers for stochastic programming problems like SQG [12].
The system depicted in Figure 3 is now in advanced stages of development, in partic-
ular the service model component and some mathematical models of service provisioning
were implemented in Matlab [2]. The next Section describes some of the results of one
case study performed using this system.
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6 Case study
This case study deals with the analysis of the service provider centric business model
for provision of the platform bundle of services to a business person on the move who
uses his smart mobile phone to access this service offer. The setting of this case study
is described in Example 1 introduced in Section 3. The Edition 1 of the prototype of the
decision support system implementing models from this paper was used for the analysis
of this case study. This edition includes the models described in Sections 3 and 4.
Considerable data preparation effort was made for this case study. First of all, we have
developed the service composition matrix, showing which enabler participates in which
services. This relation between different enablers and services is shown in Figure 1.
We have obtained also an average estimate of the service usage (in service instances) in
a period of interest, and prices per service instance. These data we have estimated by
averaging various service composition and business scenarios. On the basis of technical
and economic analysis we have obtained the cost estimates and the correlation matrix
showing the correlation between the usage of services and the variance of service usage.
Suppose that the service provider is using our DSS for performing the feasibility study
for provision of this bundle of business services similarly to the discussion at the end of
Section 3.3. There are many different what-if questions of interest to the prospective
service provider to which this DSS can provide the answers. Let us provide an example
of this analysis. Suppose that the service provider feels that the success of the whole
enterprise depends critically on the quality and offer of specialized content which can
be obtained for his services by engaging prospective content providers (enabler E4 from
Figure 1). He wants to get insight into the properties of the content providers which may
be interested in collaboration with him and in the chances that his service offer in this
respect will stand against the competition of the 3rd party services. One way to do this is
to look how the service portfolios and risk/profit preferences of prospective partners will
depend on correlation and relative pricing of his offer against the offer of competition.
Figures 4 and 5 provide examples of answers which our modeling system can deliver.
Figures 4 and 5 show how the characteristics and attitudes of the content providers
towards the service platform depend on the alternatives which the competition can offer to
them. Figure 4 shows risk/profit efficient frontiers similar to frontier presented in Figure 2
while Figure 5 depicts the percentage share of the content provision capability of the
content providers dedicated to the service platform. In other words, the Figure 5 shows
the market share of the service platform in the market for this specific type of content
provision dependent on the risk tolerance of the content providers. The competing offer
is described by the average price per unit of content and by how the actual price can differ
from the average price dependent on the future market conditions, as measured by the
price variance.
The figures present three scenarios. In all three scenarios the competition tries to
undercut the service platform by offering about 15% higher average price to content
providers for their services. The three scenarios differ by how strong the competition
is, that is by its capability to maintain the price consistently higher under the changing
market conditions. In scenario 1 shown by the thick solid lines the competition is strong
and has its price variance about two times smaller compared with the platform offer. In
scenario 2 depicted by the thick dashed lines the competition is about as strong as the
platform offer and has the similar price variance. In scenario 3 shown with thin solid lines
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Figure 4: Dependence of risk/return preferences of content providers on the strength of
competition
the competition is weaker than the platform and has about twice higher variability of its
offer to content providers than the platform.
The results show that in scenario 1 with strong competition only economically weak
content providers with small tolerance towards losses will be interested in the collabora-
tion with the platform. Often this will correspond to small firms or even individuals who
can not sustain large losses. For such entities participation in the platform means addi-
tional security and insurance against losses in the case when the strong competing offer
will prove to be deceitful in reality. Even then, the interest of such firms drops sharply
when their risk tolerances grow even by a small amount.
Scenario 3 corresponds to the opposite case when the platform faces aggressive but
economically relatively weak competition. Its weakness manifests itself in large variabil-
ity of its price offer to the content providers despite the 15% higher average price. In this
case the market share of the platform services is much higher and the platform manages
to attract also strong actors with higher capacities to sustain losses. Also the market share
drops slower with the increase of the loss tolerance of the agents. Scenario 2 corresponds
to the intermediate case when the competition is about as strong as the platform and has
about the same capability to maintain its price offer to the service providers.
Similar patterns arise when the variability of the revenue steam of content providers
is due not to the changes in the unit price of content but due to the variability of usage
frequencies of this content. Having these predictions, the platform service provider can
now realistically weight his own strength and weaknesses, invest more effort into market
research and decide under which market conditions, with what kind of partners and with
what kind of competition he can successfully operate the platform.
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Figure 5: Share of platform services in the service portfolios of content providers
7 Modeling issues
In the previous Sections we have analyzed the network risks which arise in the process
of collaborative provision of advanced mobile data services which will form ever more
important part of information infrastructure. In this Section we look at another aspect of
the same situation which is the process of service adoption by a heterogeneous population
of users. The process of service adoption is of fundamental importance to the successful
development of information infrastructure because by its very nature the value of this
infrastructure for a given user grows with the amount of users already covered by its
different components. Adopting the language of microeconomics one can say that the
elements of information infrastructure exhibit strong externalities. Modeling of these
externalities and related risks requires tools and approaches for quantitative modeling of
attitudes. In this and subsequent Sections we look at one such possible methodologies
based on Bayesian nets.
We formulate a stochastic, dynamic model of attitude formation that takes special
account of individual interactions and networks governing intrinsic dynamics of attitudes.
The model accounts also explicitly for various external factors such as new information,
stimulus, events, actions or some sort of social pressure. If different sets of external factors
are activated at different times, the system may show more or less complex dynamics, in
particular, it may lead to different alternative attractors. This we distinguish between two
types of influences: (1) the influence of the attitudes of others, and (2) the influence of
information about external factors.
According to our model different individuals may receive different information. This
information with subjective judgments is transformed through chains of communications
to other individuals. Attitudes change in a probabilistic manner depending on the attitudes
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of others and information about the external factors. Individuals are socially linked to
others by relationships mediated through a series of intertwining interactions and resulting
in a highly diverse social network. This complexity can be modeled by the recent notion
of Bayesian networks or more general notion of Markov fields. This notion is natural
generalization of Markov chains to dynamic and spatial processes, whose domains are
not necessarily linearly ordered.
7.1 Simplified model: direct and indirect interdependencies
In order to demonstrate the dynamics of attitude change, we can begin with representing
the public in groups with similar attitudes. Most empirical attitude research structures
the sampled population into cohorts, possibly by age, sex, income, profession, ethnicity,
profession, geographic location, political party affiliation, etc. We assume that population
may be divided into ”similar-attitude” groups such that an individual has a higher proba-
bility of sharing the same attitudes with others in the similar-attitude group than with in-
dividuals in other groups. Individuals communicate mainly with individuals within their
group, but also with individuals in other groups. Figure 6 shows a simplified illustra-
tion of possible interactions between five similar-attitude groups that individuals of each
group have the same attitudes. The groups are represented by nodes, and interactions are
represented by arrows. Thus there is a link from group 3 to group 1, meaning that group
3 has an influence (positive or negative) on group 1. There are also links from group 1 to
group 2 and from group 2 to 3. The example can be generalized to N groups, where the
arrow from node i to node j indicates a link from i to j.
1
34
52
Figure 6: Graph of direct relationships
The direct links between nodes can be represented by the adjacency matrix shown in
Fig. 7. An element of this N × N matrix indicates the position and possibly strength of
direct dependency links from i to j.
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nodes 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 0 0
Figure 7. The incidence matrix of the graph from Figure 6
In addition to direct dependencies, individuals are also indirectly influenced by one
another by chains of communications. If A is the adjacency matrix, then an element (i, j)
of the matrixA2 = A×A represents the number of sequential dependency paths of length
2 involving an intermediate group from i to j and in general Al indicates the number of
sequential dependency paths of length l with l− 1 intermediate groups from i to j. Thus,
the entries of the matrix
A+A2 + ...+Al
represent the number of all possible direct and indirect paths of no more length than l.
The graph on Fig. 6 has a cycle between nodes 1, 2, 3. The graph on Fig. 8 is acyclic
which represents hierarchical structure of opinion formation.
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Figure 7: Acyclic graph
Consider now a simple situation of how the links between individuals may affect their
attitudes. Suppose that links between five groups of individuals are represented in Fig-
ure 6. Figure 9 indicates that groups 1, 2, 3 have two possible (no-yes) attitudes j = 0, 1.
This is represented by subnodes 0 or 1 inside of each node i = 1, 2, 3. We can also think
about 0 − 1 states of these nodes. In this example we assume the deterministic nature of
interactions. Therefore assume the state j = 1 is settled down at nodes i = 1, 2, 3 at the
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initial time interval t = 0. In general case at time t = 0 the state j = 1 is accepted only
by a fraction of a group with a certain probability
Interdependencies between groups may change their attitudes. Arrows in the graph of
Figure 9 indicate that individuals of the group 1 are influenced by group 3 in the sense
that it expresses solidarity with group 1 taking the same opinion. Group 2 is antagonistic
(in opposition) to group 1. Group 3 has the solidarity with group 2.
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Figure 8: Limit Cycle attractor: waves of opinions
It easy to see a cyclic change of responses in time. When individuals of group 2 learn
about the attitude of group 1 (state of node i = 1), the group 2 changes the attitude to the
opposite. Since the initial state of all nodes j = 1, the next state of node 2 is j = 0 which
triggers changes of states at nodes 3, 1 to j = 1. These changes lead again to state j = 1
at nodes 1, 2, 3 and so on.
Now suppose that group 3 is antagonistic to the group 2 (see Figure 10). If group 2
learns first the response of group 1 it changes the attitude 1 to 0 and so on until attitudes
reach values (1, 0, 1) for groups 1, 2, 3 correspondingly. If group 3 learns first the attitude
of group 2, the attitudes are settled down at states (0, 1, 0). Hence, the behavior of the
attitudes may display two attractors: (1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0).
These simple examples suggest that there may be waves of attitudes. Any opinion
survey at a particular time may not represent opinion at a later time. These examples also
demonstrate that delays in the learning of attitudes may change the pattern of the overall
dynamics towards different attractors. In the model of the next Section we take more
general point of view on driving forces of attitude changes. It is assumed that members
of a group may react differently at attitudes of other groups. They also may ”hesitate” to
react as the opposition or the solidarity.
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Figure 9: Fixed Point attractors
7.2 Model formulation
In examples of the previous Section individuals of each group have the same attitude. The
individuals of a group also react in the same manner at ”signals” (attitudes) from other
groups. In this Section we undertake more general view. It is assumed that only a fraction
pitj of the group i members have attitude j at time t. Thus in the previous examples there
may be fractions pit0 , pit1 of each group i = 1, 2, 3 with attitudes 0 and 1 at time t. Of
course, pit0 + p
it
1 = 1.
Individuals of a group communicate with different individuals of other groups. There-
fore, their attitudes are influenced by random samples of information from adjacent (neigh-
bor) groups. Individuals may form their attitudes at a particular time interval t, on the
basis of various rules besides just ”solidarity” or ”opposition” principles. For example
they may follow the majority attitude from a sampled opinions. In general such behavior
induces a conditional probability for an individual of group i to take an attitude from the
given set of possible attitudes. This probability is conditioned on their current attitudes,
the attitudes of adjacent groups and some exogenous variables or external factors.
Let us now formulate the model precisely. To do so, we must represent the driving
forces of attitude changes or dependencies between groups as well as dependencies of
these relations on external factors. We opted for probabilistic description based on condi-
tional distributions.
The model distinguishes N groups i = 1, ..., N of individuals. The number of the
relevant groups depends on the issue under consideration and on the level of detail repre-
sented in the model.
Individuals display different attitudes to the given issue, ranging from hostile to very
favorable. We assume that there is a finite number M of possible attitudes. The attitudes
of individuals of group i are described by the random variable ζi which takes values from
1 to M. In other words we assume that individuals from group i statistically follow the
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same pattern of attitude formation given by the distribution of ζi. In this sense, we can
say that individuals of group i share approximately the same view. The attitudes of the
population are described by random vector ζ = (ζ1, ..., ζN). A fixed value of this vector is
denoted by z and the set of all possible attitudes by Z. Let us denote by pitj the probability
that a member of group i assumes the attitude j at time t:
pitj = P(ζ
t
i = j)
Naturally,
M∑
j=1
pitj = 1, p
it
j ≥ 0
Interactions between individuals are represented as a graph similar to graph of Section 7.1.
Groups i = 1, ..., N correspond to nodes of the graph and direct links between individuals
of groups are represented by arrows between nodes. Thus there are two sets: nodes V =
1, ..., N and the set of arrows (directed arcs) U . Let us denote this as G = (V, U). If nodes
i, j belong to V , i, j ∈ V and there is an arrow from i to j, (i, j) ∈ U then i is an adjacent
to j node. Define as Vj the set of all adjacent to j nodes and node j. Let zVj is subvector of
the vector of attitudes indexed by Vj. For example, in the case of dependencies indicated
by graph in Figure 6 we have V1 = {1, 3, 4}, V2 = {1, 2, 5}, V3 = {2, 3, 4}, V4 = {∅ },
V5 = {∅} where ∅ is the symbol of empty set. Then zV1 = (z1, z3, z4), zV2 = (z1, z2, z5).
Individuals change their attitudes depending on current attitudes of their own and
adjacent groups, and on a vector x of exogenous external factors or variables. The attitude
formation is described by a conditional distribution Hi(zi|zVi, x) for each individual of
group i: the probability for an individual of group i to have an attitude zi = 1, 2, ...,M
when attitudes of groups Viare ZViand external factors have values x.
We assume that function Hi can be derived on the basis of appropriate questionnaires
answered by a representative member of individuals from each group, as: ”What is your
attitude (from 1to M) if attitudes of the adjacent groups are zViand the ”environment is
x = (x1, ..., xn)?”. Functions Hi may also depend on time interval t, but we skip it in
order to simplify the notations. Functions Hi define the dynamics of the attitude change
according to the following relation:
pi,t+1j =
∑
zVi∈Z
Hi(ζt+1i = j|ζ
t
Vi
= zVi; x
t)P(ζtVi = zVi) (26)
The groups i with Vi = i can be identified with ”leaders”, which influence opinions
of other individuals but are not influenced themselves.
To define completely the dynamics of the system described by equation (26) it is
necessary to fix initial attitudes distributions for t = 0. In case when the corresponding
graph of direct influences is acyclic, it is enough to define these distributions for nodes i
such that Vi = i.
Equation (26) together with initial distributions allow us in principle to calculate pitj for
any t ≥ 0. Of course, for complex graphs it is practically impossible to derive analytical
formulas for pitj as functions of external factors x. The existence of analytical expressions
for all pitj provides an easy tool to analyze implications of changes in x. The next Section
is devoted to the analysis of attitudes changes in the case when such a possibility does not
– 26 –
exist. The approach is based on the stochastic version of equation (26) dealing directly
with random variables ζti , i = 1, ..., N by using the Monte-Carlo simulation techniques.
Instead of Hi, i = 1, ..., N the approach allows also to use myopic rules to generate
random changes of ζt i.e. the approach allows to analyze cases when functions Hi are
given implicitly. One such important case arises in the situations when individuals form
their attitudes by asking acquaintances from adjacent groups and use some simple rules
based on majority or minority of sampled attitudes.
Let us now formulate some problems which are important in this context.
Problem 1. Evaluation of Attitudes.
The objective here is to predict attitudes of various population groups. As we have
seen in the previous Section the attitudes of different groups change in intricate ways and
are subject to changes in external factors and direct and indirect dependencies. Direct
dependencies involve relatively few adjacent groups, while indirect dependencies and ex-
ternal factors may involve all or almost all population groups. Thus, in Figure 1 group 2
is affected directly only by groups 1, 5. But there exists a path from 3 to 2, and from 4
to 2. Therefore indirectly individuals of group 2 are affected by all groups. The direct de-
pendencies are much easier to study experimentally through surveys and questionnaires.
Suppose that we managed to study the direct dependencies between attitudes of different
adjacent population groups. The problem is to predict the public attitudes as the result of
complex direct and indirect interactions by using the information about direct dependen-
cies. As was outlined in the previous Section, this problem involves the calculation of all
possible direct and indirect paths by using the adjacency matrix (Figure 7). Formally the
problem is formulated as follows.
Given conditional distributions Hi(zi|zVi; x) for i = 1 : N and the values of xt for
t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 find distributions P(ζTi ), i = 1 : N of random variables ζTi , i.e. the
public attitudes at time T .
Problem 2. Response interpretation.
This problem deals with the interpretation (identification) of public response to a mix-
ture of events and efforts which influence the public. This interpretation is made on the
basis of our knowledge which has two components. The first component is the apri-
ori information on direct dependencies deduced from responses in the past. The second
component consists of new direct observations of attitudes for some groups to a given
new issue. This type of knowledge can be called aposteriori knowledge. The response
interpretation deals with the following questions:
• Suppose that we have direct observations on the attitudes of only some selected groups,
or we have observations of aggregated response from several groups. How can we
recover attitudes of unobserved groups?
• How to use the newly acquired aposteriori knowledge to update our knowledge about
direct dependencies between groups?
• Often a public response is the result of mixture of different, sometimes conflicting
events and efforts. What is the contribution of each single event to the attitude dy-
namics?
Formally these problems can be formulated as follows. Let us consider only first
problem. Denote by VE the set of observed groups.
Given conditional distributions Hi(zi|zVi; x) for i = 1 : N , the values of xt and
distributions P(ζti ), i ∈ VE for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 find distributions P(ζti ) for i 6∈ VE .
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Problem 3. Sensitivity analysis.
Here we want to analyze a sensitivity of attitudes with respect to changes of environ-
mental variable x. Through such an analysis we may find that attitudes are especially
resistant to changes in certain directions or in certain positions. For example, in siting a
waste processing facility as we mentioned already it is necessary to analyze the choice
of its size, decide on the distance between facility and population centers, choose routes
of the waste transportation etc. Different population groups react differently on different
options. Small changes in critical parameters may affect considerably the public attitudes,
while substantial and possibly costly changes in non-critical parameters will not move the
public response. The objective of the sensitivity analysis is to identify the critical param-
eters utilizing the knowledge of the direct dependencies and how these dependencies are
affected by changes in environmental parameters.
In terms of our model the sensitivities of public responses is defined in terms of
changes in response distribution P(·) with respect to parameters x. This leads to the
following formulation.
Given conditional distributions Hi(zi|zVi; x) for i = 1 : N and the values of xt for
t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 estimate derivatives of distributions P(ζTi ), i = 1 : N with respect to
x0, ..., xT .
Note that distributions P(·) depend on x indirectly through conditional distributions
H, what leads to a challenging problems analyzed in next Sections.
Problem 4. Social learning.
As it is emphasized in social psychology people receive information from their social
environment. A lack of connectivity between them develops clusters of people sharing
similar views in a more heterogeneous population. Traditionally it is assumed that a
change in thought or behavior is only a reaction to some external factors, stimulus. The
proposed model emphasized the existence of intrinsic changes generated by interdepen-
dencies between individuals in the absence of any external factor. This dynamics may be
perturbed by external factors activated at different times leading to more or less complex
patterns of alternative dynamics. How can we learn the variety of alternative attitudinal
developments and how we can characterize them? What are optimistic and pessimistic
”scenarios” of such developments? Can attitudes reach vital levels? Answers to these
type of questions depend not only on existing links between individuals but also on paths
of activated external factors. The main problem is to use the model in order to learn pos-
sible alternative scenarios and their outcomes. For example, in the debates on siting a
waste processing facility, for example, there is a possibility to change sizes of facilities,
their locations, premiums and other compensations in order to change public responses.
The power of a model is its ability to learn patterns of possible responses of the system
without time consuming real observations and trial - and - error experiments. In our
case the model allows to identify paths of external factors leading to different outcomes,
for example decreasing a social tension, or to worst case situation. In order to conduct
such analysis we need to introduce a set of ”performance” indicators or ”score” functions
distinguishing one trajectory of attitudes from another. For example, if cij is relative
importance of attitude j by individuals of group i, then the cumulative score of a trajectory
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of attitudes can be expressed by the following score (performance) function:
F (x) =
T∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
cijp
it
j , (27)
which implicitly depends on external factors x through conditional probabilities in (26).
The sensitivity analysis can indicate changes in x which lead to increasing of an indi-
cator F (x). Using this information, it is possible to identify, for example, the worst or the
best case sets of possible external factors.
The fundamental complexity of such type of problems is due to the probabilistic nature
of F (x) and implicit dependencies on variables x. Next Sections discuss tools enabling
to deal with involved complexity.
7.3 Bayesian Networks and Markov Fields
The Bayesian Net is a powerful tool which was developed primarily to deal with stochastic
problems defined on acyclic graphs (see Figure 8). We show that algorithms developed
for Bayesian Nets constitute the building blocks for more general algorithms which can
deal also with general graphs.
Bayesian nets are specifically designed for cases when the vector of random param-
eters ζ can have considerable dimension and/or it is difficult to come up with traditional
parametrical model of the joint distribution of random parameters.
1. The cause-effect structure is associated with the vector of random parameters ζ =
(ζ1, ..., ζi, ..., ζN). That is, for any parameter ζi the set of indices Vi is selected such that
the elements of subvector {ζj}j∈Vi can be identified with ”causes” of ζi. Vector ζi is
changed in time leading to a random path or trajectory ζt, t = 0, 1, .... In the proposed
model groups of a population, say in a given region, are represented as nodes of a graph.
Direct dependencies between groups are represented by arrows indicating directions of
communications. Node i of the graph has different random states ζti at time t reflecting
different attitudes of the group. Thus the stochastic dynamics of attitudes is characterized
by a random vector ζt with dependent components. The important feature is that changes
in a component ζti are triggered only by its ”neighbors” ζtj, j ∈ Vi, apart from changes in
external factors.
Such stochastic processes define Markov random fields. They can be regarded as
generalization of Markov processes to situations when the cause effect structure is not
necessarily linearly ordered. Let us start the formal exposition by gathering the basic
definitions which will be used in next Sections. Consider a directed graph defined as
a pair of two sets (V, U): nodes V and connecting them arrows (directed arcs) U . An
example of such graph is given in Figure 6 with V = {1, 2, ..., 9}. For each node v ∈ V
let us define the set of parents
c(v) = {j|(j, v) ∈ E} (28)
and the set of descendants
d(v) = {j|(v, j) ∈ E} (29)
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Consider a set of random variables ζV = {ζv, v ∈ V } indexed by nodes from V and
defined on appropriate probability space (Ω, B ,P). Suppose that W is an arbitrary subset
of V . A Markov random field ζ is characterized by the property
P(ζv|ζW∪c(v)) = P(ζv|ζc(v)) (30)
If G is a directed acyclic graph, then (ζ,G) which satisfies (30) is called Bayesian
Network.
Suppose now that H(ζ) is the joint distribution of ζ. Then it follows from the defini-
tion of the Bayesian Network that
H(ζ) =
∏
v∈V
Hv(ζv|ζc(v)) (31)
where Hv(ζv|ζc(v)) is a conditional distribution function of ζv given ζc(v).
Coming back to the model of Section 3 we see that it fits in the framework of Bayesian
Networks and Markov fields. The essential new feature is the dependence of the condi-
tional distribution functions Hv on the vector of external variables x from a feasible set
X ⊆ Rn:
Hv(·) = Hv(ζv|ζc(v), x) (32)
The change of x ∈ X affects the interactions between groups.
7.4 Sensitivity analysis
The analysis aims to analyze attitudes with respect to changes in external factors x. These
changes are characterized by certain indicators or ”score” functions such as (27). A given
x defines the random attitudes ζ = ζ(x). A performance indicator is a function of ζ and
possibly x, e.g., f(x, ζ).
The first question which can be raised is the following. How can we estimate the
expected outcome
F (x) = Ef(x, ζ) (33)
at some point x? How sensitive is this value with respect to changes in parameters x?
What are the most critical parameters? What is the value of the performance indicator at
point x + δx where δx is a small perturbation of x? These questions are not the trivial
because each estimation of the value of F (x) can be very time consuming taking into
account indirect interdependencies of the network.
More precisely, in order to evaluate the sensitivity of F (x) we need to develop algo-
rithms for estimating the value of the gradient of this indicator. That is, for given x we
need to compute vector ξ such that
Eξ = Fx(x) =
d
dx
Ef(x, ζ)
One possibility is to use the finite differences:
ξ =
n∑
i=1
Fˆ (x+∆ei)− Fˆ (x)
∆
ei
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where Fˆ (x) is an estimate of the value of function F (x) at point x. In this case, however,
it is necessary to compute at least n+1 estimates of the performance measure which may
be too demanding computationally.
Let us introduce simple but useful differentiation formulas for the gradient of function
F (x), which are used in stochastic optimization.
Theorem 2 Suppose that
1. Random variables ζv have conditional densities h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
2. Functions h(ζv|ζc(v), x), f(x, ζ) are differentiable with respect to x uniformly with
respect to ζ. Then F (x) defined in (33) is differentiable and
Fx(x) = E
{
fx(x, ζ) + f(x, ζ)
∑
v∈V
hx(ζv|ζc(v), x)
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
}
(34)
Proof.
From (31) we have the following expression for F (x):
F (x) =
∫
f(x, ζ)
∏
v∈V
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
∏
v∈V
dζv (35)
Under assumptions of the theorem we can change the order of differentiation and integra-
tion, which yields:
Fx(x) =
∫
d
dx
(
f(x, ζ)
∏
v∈V
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
)∏
v∈V
dζv =
∫
fx(x, ζ)
∏
v∈V
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
∏
v∈V
dζv +
∑
w∈V
∫
f(x, ζ)hx(ζw|ζc(w), x))
∏
v∈V, v 6=w
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
∏
v∈V
dζv =
∫ (
fx(x, ζ) + f(x, ζ)
∑
v∈V
hx(ζv|ζc(v), x)
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
)∏
v∈V
h(ζv|ζc(v), x)
∏
v∈V
dζv
The proof is completed. ⋄
Similar result holds when each of the random variables ζv takes finite number of values
and instead of conditional densities we have conditional probabilities P (ζv|ζc(v), x). If
these probabilities are differentiable with respect to x we obtain the following expression
for Fx(x):
Fx(x) = E
{
fx(x, ζ) + f(x, ζ)
∑
v∈V
Px(ζv|ζc(v), x)
P (ζv|ζc(v), x)
}
(36)
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Note that the second terms in expressions (34),(36) can be interpreted as sums of likeli-
hood ratios [15, 23]. The calculation of exact values Fx(x) is possible only in exceptional
cases for simple networks.
Let us now present estimation algorithms which exploit the structure of Bayesian net-
work and expressions (34),(36) in order to obtain statistical estimates of F (x) and Fx(x).
We shall make reference to discrete case and use (36), the continuous case is treated sim-
ilarly. The simplest estimation scheme is the following:
ξ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(
fx(x, ζ
k) + f(x, ζk)
∑
v∈V
Px(ζkv |ζ
k
c(v), x)
P (ζkv |ζ
k
c(v), x)
)
(37)
where ζk, ζkv , ζkc(v), k = 1 : K, K ≥ 1 are independent observations of random vectors
ζ, ζv, ζc(v) respectively. Stochastic vector ξ is termed as stochastic gradient. The estima-
tion scheme (37) in the context of Bayesian networks is called also as Logic Sampling.
The estimator (37) requires K ≥ 1 observations (”scenarios”) of attitudes ζ. This sce-
narios can be sequentially generated by using Monte-Carlo simulation techniques. An
arbitrary scenario generating cycle k = 1 : K have the following simple steps.
1. Initialization. Select a node v ∈ V such that c(v) is the empty set, c(v) = ∅. Since
the graph G is acyclic such nodes exist and we interpreted them as sources of opinions
or leader nodes. Sample the component ζv from unconditional distribution P (ζv|ζc(v), x)
and denote the result as ζkv . Perform this step for all nodes with empty parent set c(v).
2. Selection. Select a not sampled yet node v ∈ V such that all random variables
ζj j ∈ c(v) have been sampled already during current scenario generating cycle. Suppose
that the observation of ζj is ζkj , j ∈ c(v).
3. Sampling. Sample random variable ζv and obtain an observation ζkv .
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until all random components of ζ are sampled. In other
words until all groups reveal their opinions.
Note that by using observations ζk, k = 1 : K, K ≥ 1 along with the estimates of
the gradient Fx we obtain the estimate of F (x) itself. For example, F (x) may correspond
to the probability for ζ to belong to a certain desirable domain (for example, majority of
attitudes 1 (yes) to competing attitudes 0 (no)) we obtain the estimates of this probability
and its sensitivity ξ.
There may be other sampling schemes known as Evidence Weighting [4] and Gibbs
Sampling [14] which are particularly useful for the solution of the response interpretation
problem (Problem 2 from Section 7.2). Such schemes use the structure of the network
and aposteriori distributions instead of P (ζv|ζc(v), x). The estimates of stochastic gradient
obtained above can be used for obtaining the optimal values of parameters using stochastic
quasigradient methods like in [7, 8, 9].
7.5 General interdependencies
Let us extend the analysis of the previous Section to the case of cyclic graphs. The expo-
sition follows closely the exposition of the previous Section and therefore we concentrate
on the new features only. The most important among these features is the dynamic aspect
of attitudes change which in the case of conventional Bayesian Network was reduced to
analysis of their propagation from ”leaders” to other groups.
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Let us fix the time horizon [0, l] during which we study the attitude dynamics and sen-
sitivity estimates. Such estimates will be called l-links estimates. Generally, the variables
x may change during this time period: x = (x0, ..., xl−1). For the sake of simplicity we
shall derive our estimates for the case when x0 = x1 = ... = xl−1 denoting this constant
vector by x. The general case does not bring any conceptual difficulties and is treated
similarly.
Consider again the case when conditional distributions has densities. Consider a per-
formance measure which will be the following generalization of the measure (35):
F (x) =
∫
f(x, ζ¯ l)h(x, ζ¯ l)dζ¯ l (38)
where for t = 0, ..., l we denoted by h(x, ζ¯t) the joint density of the random vector ζ¯t =
(ζ0, ..., ζt) with ζt = (ζt1, ..., ζtN) and
dζ¯ l =
l∏
t=1
∏
v∈V
dζtv
The density of ζ¯t is connected with the density of ζ¯t−1 for t = 1, ..., l with the following
relation:
h(x, ζ¯t) = h(x, ζ¯t−1)
∏
v∈V
h(ζtv|ζ
t−1
c(v), x) (39)
with the initial distribution h(x, ζ¯0) density being simply
h(x, ζ¯0) =
∏
v∈V
h(ζ0v ) (40)
Combining expressions (38)-(40) we obtain the basic formula for the performance mea-
sure:
F (x) =
∫
f(x, ζ¯ l)
∏
v∈V
h(ζ0v )
l∏
t=1
∏
v∈V
h(ζtv|ζ
t−1
c(v), x)
l∏
t=1
∏
v∈V
dζtv (41)
Utilizing this expression similarly to the previous Section we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3 Suppose that
1. Random variables ζtv have conditional densities h(ζtv|ζtc(v), x) for t = 1, .., l and
densities h(ζ0) for t = 0.
2. Functions h(x, ζtv|ζtc(v)), f(x, ζ¯ l) are differentiable with respect to x uniformly with
respect to ζ¯ l. Then F (x) defined in (38) is differentiable and
Fx(x) = E
{
fx(x, ζ¯ l) + f(x, ζ¯ l)
l∑
t=1
∑
v∈V
hx(ζtv|ζ
t−1
c(v), x)
h(ζtv|ζ
t−1
c(v), x)
}
(42)
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As in the previous Section similar result holds when each of the random variables
ζtv takes finite number of values and instead of conditional densities we have conditional
probabilities P (x, ζtv|ζtc(v), x). If these probabilities are differentiable with respect to x we
obtain the following expression for Fx(x):
Fx(x) = E
{
fx(x, ζ¯ l) + f(x, ζ¯ l)
l∑
t=1
∑
v∈V
Px(ζtv|ζ
t−1
c(v), x)
P (ζtv|ζ
t−1
c(v), x)
}
(43)
The l-stage sensitivity estimate based on logic sampling in the discrete case takes the
form:
ξ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(
fx(x, ζ¯
kl) + f(x, ζ¯kl)
l∑
t=1
∑
v∈V
Px(ζktv |ζ
k,t−1
c(v) , x)
P (x, ζktv |ζ
k,t−1
c(v) , x)
)
(44)
where ζ¯kt, ζktv , ζktc(v), t = 0, 1, ..., l, k = 1 : K, K ≥ 1 are independent observations of
random vectors ζ¯t, ζtv, ζtc(v) respectively. The vector ξ defines a stochastic gradient of the
function F (x) in (38).
Observations ζkt, k = 1 : K of random vectors ζt, t = 0, 1, ..., l can be simulated
similar to acyclic graphs of the previous Section. In fact the study of l-stage interdepen-
dencies between groups (nodes) on general graphs can be reduced to the study of l-stage
sensitivity estimates on acyclic graphs.
This reduction of l-stage sensitivity analysis to acyclic graphs provides a general ap-
proach to the study of the general nets with cyclic graphs. Keeping in mind this possibility
let us describe the Monte-Carlo simulation procedure for the generation k = 1 : K sce-
narios ζ, t = 0, 1, ..., l describing l-stage propagation effects of public attitudes.
1. Initialization Leader nodes of the equivalent acyclic graph (see Figure 6) corre-
spond to t = 0 Therefore for all v ∈ V sample the values ζkt of random variables ζtv ,
t = 0.
2. Selection Select all nodes v ∈ V sequentially for t = 1 : K.
3. Sampling For a sampled node v at step t sample random variables ζkt+1v from
distribution P (ζt+1v |ζvt = ζktv , x). Steps 2, 3 are repeated until all components ζkt of
vectors ζt, t = 0, 1, ..., l are sampled.
Scenarios ζkt, t = 0, 1, ..., l, k = 1 : K of public attitudes allow to estimate vector
Fx(x) according to (44). As in the previous Section this vector indicates directions of
changes in x towards the increase of indicator F (x).
8 Conclusion
In the present paper we set the stage for further development of modeling and decision
support tools for analysis of design and deployment of robust information infrastructure
using as the case study one component of this infrastructure: advanced mobile data ser-
vices. Particular methodologies utilized here: portfolio theory and Bayesian nets com-
bined with stochastic optimization have a potential to be utilized also for solution of sim-
ilar problems arising with other types of infrastructure.
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